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This  paper  addresses  two  questions.  First,  what  causes  the  paper-bill 
spread  to  vary  over  time  in  anticipation  of  income  fluctuations’!  Second,  why 
has  the  predictive  power  of  the  spread  declined  in  recent  years? 
Consistent  with  previous  empirical  work,  the  paper  provides  evidence  for 
the  default-risk,  monetary,  and  cash-flow  hypotheses.  Moreover,  new  evidence 
is  provided  for  the  liquidity  hypothesis  by  showing  that  uncertainty  has  a 
strong  impact  on  the  paper-bill  spread.  This  finding  holds  for  two  different 
approaches  used  to  measure  uncertainty  -  financial  market  volatility  and 
forecaster  discord  -  and  for  uncertainty  about  five  different  variables: 
the  federal  funds  rate,  the  Treasury  bill  rate,  the  long-term  corporate  bond 
rate,  stock  returns,  and  industrial  production. 
Using  a  Kalman  filter  to  recursively  estimate  the  reduced-form  model  for 
the  paper-bill  spread,  the  paper  shows  that  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  and 
uncertainty  on  the  spread  declined  during  the  198Os,  while  the  impact  of 
default  risk  increased.  These  findings  are  explained  by  two  financial  market 
developments  occurring  during  the  1980s:  1)  the  rapid  growth  in  the  volume  and 
liquidity  of  the  commercial  paper  market,  and  2)  increased  financial  fragility 
of  commercial  paper  issuers. I.  Introduction 
Figure  1  shows  the  spread  between  interest  rates  on  six-month  commercial 
paper  and  Treasury  bills  (the  paper-bill  spread)  along  with  shaded  regions 
that  denote  recessions  dated  by  the  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research.  The 
paper-bill  spread  has  received  a  great  deal  of  attention  recently  because 
several  researchers  have  shown  that  it  provides  -  at  least  until  the  mid- 
1980s  -  considerable  predictive  power  for  fluctuations  in  several  different 
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measures  of  macroeconomic  activity.  t  These  finding  have  raised  two  related 
questions.  First,  what  causes  the  paper-bill  spread  to  vary  over  time  in 
anticipation  of  macroeconomic  fluctuations  ?  Second,  why  has  the  predictive 
power  of  the  spread  declined  in  recent  years‘.  )  This  paper  addresses  both  of 
these  questions. 
Four  hypotheses  have  been  put  forth  to  explain  the  strong  predictive 
performance  of  the  paper-bill  spread.  First,  the  default-risk  hypothesis 
argues  that  the  paper-bill  spread  rises  prior  to  contractions  in  economic 
activity  because  investors  anticipate  that  contractions  will  limit  the  ability 
of  firms  to  generate  cash  flow  necessary  to  service  their  debts  and  thus 
demand  a  default  premium  to  hold  commercial  paper.  Second,  the  monetary 
hypothesis  posits  that  the  spread  has  strong  predictive  power  because  it 
accurately  measures  the  stance  of  monetary  policy  which  is  an  important 
determinant  of  economic  activity.  Third,  the  cash-flow  hypothesis  asserts 
that  the  spread  rises  prior  to  and  during  recessions  because  depressed  product 
demand  forces  firms  to  finance  inventory  accumulation  by  issuing  increased 
quantities  of  commercial  paper.  Finally,  the  liquidity  hypothesis  argues  that 
the  spread  provides  strong  predictive  power  because  recessions  are  associated 
with  increased  uncertainty  that  induces  investors  to  raise  their  demand  for 
liquid  assets,  such  as  Treasury  bills,  while  reducing  their  demand  for 
1 relatively  illiquid  assets,  such  as  commercial  paper. 
As  we  discuss  below,  empirical  support  has  been 
risk,  monetary,  and  cash-flow  hypotheses.  In  contrast, 
provided  for  the  default- 
little  empirical  work 
has  addressed  the  liquidity  hypothesis.  We  fill  this  void  in  the  literature 
by  examining  the  impact  that  uncertainty  has  on  the  paper-bill  spread.  To  do 
this,  we  use  measures  of  financial  market  volatility  and  forecaster  discord 
from  the  Blue  Chip  survey  to  construct  uncertainty  proxies  for  five  different 
variables:  the  federal  funds,  Treasury  bill,  and  long-term  corporate  bond 
rates;  stock  returns  and  industrial  production.  We  show  that  each  of  these 
uncertainty  measures  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  paper-bill  spread  even 
after  controlling  for  the  influence  of  other  determinants.  These  findings 
have  important  policy  implications  because  they  suggest  that  the  Federal 
Reserve  can  influence  the  paper-bill  spread  (and  the  cost  of  non-bank  credit) 
not  only  by  changing  the  stance  of  its  policy,  but  also  by  limiting  the  risk 
injected  into  financial  markets  by  federal  funds  rate  volatility. 
To  explain  the  diminished  predictive  power  of  the  paper-bill  spread,  we 
focus  on  two  major  developments  in  U.S.  financial  markets  during  the  1980s: 
1)  the  rapid  growth  in  the  volume  and  liquidity  of  the  commercial  paper 
market,  and  2)  the  increased  financial  fragility  of  U.S.  corporations.  2  The 
tremendous  development  of  the  secondary  market  for  commercial  paper  has  been 
noted  by  Stigum  (1990,  p.  1051)  who  observes  that,  “More  than  any  other  aspect 
of  the  commercial  paper  market,  it  is  the  secondary  market  that  has,  in  recent 
years,  been  developed.”  Moreover,  Bernanke  and  Campbell  (1988)  observe  that 
the  financial  structure  of  U.S.  corporations  became  increasingly  fragile  in 
the  1980s.  They  conclude  that,  ”  .  ..after  growing  more  slowly  than  income 
during  1969-80,  debt  and  debt  service  expanded  much  more  quickly  than  income 
and  sales  in  the  eighties...”  (p.  84). 
Section  III  of  the  paper  constructs  a  theoretical  model  to  examine  how 
2 these  developments  affect  the  reduced-form  relationship  between  the  paper-bill 
spread  and  its  determinants.  Three  important  predictions  emerge  from  the 
model.  First,  the  impact  of  uncertainty  on  the  paper-bill  spread  declines 
when  the  relative  liquidity  of  paper  increases  and  paper  and  bills  become 
closer  substitutes  in  investors’  portfolios.  Second,  default  risk  has  a 
greater  impact  on  the  spread  when  the  liquidity  or  solvency  of  paper  issuers 
declines.  Finally,  monetary  policy  has  a  diminished  effect  on  the  spread  if 
the  increased  liquidity  of  the  paper  market  raises  the  substitutability  of 
paper  and  bills  more  than  increased  financial  fragility  reduces  it. 
The  last  section  of  the  paper  evaluates  the  theoretical  predictions  by 
using  a  Kalman  filter  model  to  estimate  the  reduced-form  parameters  linking 
the  paper-bill  spread  to  its  determinants.  Consistent  with  the  predictions 
of  the  model,  we  show  that  the  uncertainty  coefficient  declined  throughout  the 
1980s  while  the  default-risk  coefficient  increased.  Also,  the  coefficients 
linking  the  paper-bill  spread  to  various  measures  of  monetary  policy  declined 
precipitously  during  the  1980s.  Taken  together,  these  findings  explain  the 
declining  predictive  power  of  the  paper-bill  spread.  That  is,  increased 
liquidity  of  the  commercial  paper  market  reduced  the  ability  of  the  spread  to 
embody  important  information  about  monetary  policy  and  uncertainty.  While 
spread  has  become  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  default  risk,  this  information 
is  less  useful  as  an  indicator  of  future  economic  activity. 
The  outline  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  The  next  section  provides  a 
brief  discussion  of  the  hypotheses  and  existing  empirical  evidence.  The 
theoretical  model  is  presented  in  Section  III.  Section  IV  discusses  data  and 
measurement  issues.  Section  V  explores  whether  the  spread  between  yields  on 
medium  and  high-grade  commercial  paper  measures  default  risk  exclusively  or 
also  contains  a  liquidity  premium.  Section  VI  examines  the  full-sample 
empirical  relationship  between  the  paper-bill  spread  and  its  determinants. 
the 
3 Section  VII  examines  the  time-varying  influence  of  the  various  determinants  on 
the  spread.  The  final  section  concludes  the  paper  and  discusses  the  policy 
implications. 
II.  Hypotheses  and  Evidence 
1.  The  Default-Risk  Hypothesis 
The  default  risk  hypothesis  argues  that  the  paper-bill  spread  contains  a 
default  premium  which  is  correlated  with  future  economic  activity.  While 
Treasury  bills  are  a  default-free  asset  backed  by  the  U.S.  government, 
commercial  paper  is  a  private  debt  subject  to  potential  default.  Because 
recessions  limit  the  ability  of  firms  to  generate  the  cash  flow  necessary  to 
service  their  debt,  forward-looking  investors  demand  compensation  for  holding 
commercial  paper  when  a  decline  in  economic  activity  is  anticipated.  To  the 
extent  that  these  anticipations  are  accurate,  on  average,  the  paper-bill 
spread  should  be  highly  correlated  with  future  movements  in  real  income. 
There  is  mixed  evidence  about  the  empirical  relevance  of  the  defdult- 
risk  hypothesis.  First,  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  large  swings  (up  to  300 
basis  points)  in  the  paper-bill  spread  with  the  fact  that  defaults  on  prime 
commercial  paper  are  infrequent.  For  example,  Fons  and  Kimball  (1992)  estimate 
the  dollar  amount  of  default  as  a  percentage  of  total  volume  issued  for  the 
1989  to  1991  period  to  be  only  .004  percent.3  Moreover,  Bernanke  (1990)  shows 
that  the  empirical  relationship  between  the  paper-bill  spread  and  the  spread 
between  yields  on  low  (BAA)  and  high  (AAA)  grade  long-term  bonds  -  a 
measure  of  default  risk  -  is  weak.  By  comparison,  Friedman  and  Kuttner 
(1993)  show  that  there  is  a  relatively  strong  positive  relationship  between 
the  paper-bill  spread  and  default  risk  measured  by  the  spread  between  medium- 
and  high-grade  commercial  paper  yields. 
4 2.  The  Monetary  Hypotheses 
There  are  two  versions 
credit  crunch  hypothesis  and 
crunch  hypothesis  posits  that 
of  the  monetary  hypothesis.  The  first  is  the 
is  due  primarily  to  Cook  (1981).  The  credit 
the  paper-bill  spread  was  a  good  monetary  policy 
indicator  during  the  1960s  and  1970s  because  of  the  pre- 1980s  regulatory 
environment  and  two  characteristics  which  differentiate  bills  from  paper: 
divisibility  and  the  nonpecuniary  services  they  provide.4  During  the  pre- 1980 
period,  restrictive  monetary  policy  caused  wealth  to  flow  out  of  bank  time 
deposits  and  into  money  market  instruments  when  market  rates  rose  above 
ceiling  rates  on  time  deposits  imposed  by  Regulation  Q.  Greater  divisibility 
of  Treasury  bills  implied  that  relatively  more  wealth  flowed  into  the  bill 
market,  thus  raising  the  paper-bill  spread.  Moreover,  banks  and  other  large 
investors  not  constrained  by  minimum  denomination  restrictions  did  not 
arbitrage  away  the  spread  because  of  the  nonpecuniary  services  that  Treasury 
bills  provided.  Thus  a  tightening  of  monetary  policy  and  disintermediation 
were  associated  with  an  increased  spread  between  paper  and  bill  yields. 
The  second  version  of  the  monetary  hypothesis  focuses  on 
substitutability  between  bills  and  paper  in  investors  portfolios.5 
to  this  hypothesis,  tight  monetary  policy  causes  borrowers  to  be 
from  the  loan  market.  When  borrowers  turn  to  the  commercial 
the  imperfect 
According 
turned  away 
paper  market  and 
issue  increased  quantities  of  paper,  upward  pressure  is  exerted  on  the  paper 
rate  and  the  paper-bill  spread.  If  investors  view  paper  and  bills  as 
imperfect  substitutes  -  due  to  differential  taxation,  default  risk, 
liquidity  and  nonpecuniary  services  provided  by  bills  -  then  arbitrage 
across  markets  by  investors  is  limited  and  the  paper  rate  rises  relative  to 
the  bill  rate. 
There  are  three  potential  problems  with  the  imperfect  substitutability 
5 hypothesis.  First,  in  addition  to  putting  upward  pressure  on  the  paper  rate, 
restrictive  monetary  policy  should  also  manifest  itself  in  higher  bill  rates. 
Two  additional  arguments  have  been  put  forth  to  explain  why  the  paper-bill 
spread  should  continue  to  rise  in  response  to  tighter  monetary  policy.  First, 
Cook  (1981)  and  Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1993)  discuss  how  the  paper-bill  spread 
is  positively  correlated  with  the  level  of  interest  rates  when  interest  earned 
on  paper  and  bills  is  taxed  at  differential  rates  or  default  risk  is  non-zero. 
Thus  to  the  extent  that  restrictive  monetary  policy  raises  all  market  rates, 
it  should  exert  upward  pressure  on  the  paper  bill  spread.  Second,  monetary 
tightening  increases  the  paper  rate  relative  to  the  bill  rate  if  the  borrowers 
forced  into  the  paper  market  are  less  credit  worthy  or  are  small  borrowers 
whose  paper  is  less  liquid.  In  this  case,  the  composition  of  outstanding 
commercial  paper  changes  and  the  market-average  commercial  paper  rate  rises  to 
reflect  the  higher  likelihood  of  default  or  decreased  liquidity  of 
representative  issues. 6 
The  second  potential  problem  with  the  imperfect  substitutability 
hypothesis  is  that  banks  may  undertake  other  adjustments  rather  than  reducing 
loan  supply  in  response  to  monetary  tightening.  For  example,  banks  might 
issue  certificates  of  deposits  (CDs)  and  other  managed  liabilities  or  sell 
Treasury  bills.  However,  Bernanke  (1990)  argues  that  banks  must  offer  higher 
rates  on  CDs  to  induce  investors  to  hold  them  and  this  leads  to  a  rise  in  the 
paper-bill  spread  because  CDs  and  paper  are  closer  substitutes  in  investors 
portfolios  than  CDs  and  bills.  If  banks  liquidate  Treasury  bills  instead, 
downward  pressure  is  exerted  on  both  the  bill  rate  and  the  paper-bill  spread. 
However,  Bernanke  argues  that  the  nonpecuniary  services  provided  to  banks  by 
Treasury  bills  limits  this  particular  reaction. 
The  third  potential  problem  with  the  imperfect  substitutability 
hypothesis  is  that  it  presumes  there  is  a  large  number  of  firms  which  have  the 
6 ability  to  obtain  credit  through  bank  loans  or  commercial  paper.  However, 
there  is  evidence  that  this  set  of  firms  is  small.’ 
Two  studies  have  provided  evidence  for  the  monetary  hypotheses.  First, 
Bernanke  (1990)  shows  that  the  paper-bill  spread  is  positively  related  to: 
1)  dummy  variables  for  the  six  post-war  periods,  identified  by  Romer  and  Romer 
(1989),  characterized  by  tight  monetary  policy,  2)  the  federal  funds  rate 
target  for  the  September  1974  to  September  1979  period,  and  3)  the  level  of 
the  federal  funds  rate  (and  the  spread  between  the  federal  funds  rate  and  the 
long-term  bond  rate).  Second,  Kashyap  et  al.  (1993)  investigate  an  indirect 
link  between  monetary  policy  and  the  paper-bill  spread.  They  show  that  a 
“mix”  variable  which  measures  the  volume  of  bank  loans  as  a  fraction  of  total 
short-term  external  finance  falls  (and  paper  issuance  rises)  following 
monetary  contractions. 
One  attractive  feature  of  both  monetary  hypotheses  is  that  they  can 
explain  the  diminished  predictive  power  of  the  paper-bill  spread  observed  in 
recent  years.  With  the  removal  of  interest  rate  ceilings  under  deregulation 
of  the  late  1970s  and  early  198Os,  tightening  of  monetary  policy  no  Iongel 
produced  widespread  disintermediation  out  of  time  deposits  into  other  money 
market  instruments.’  Moreover,  Kashyap  et  al.  (1993)  argue  that  the  impact  of 
monetary  policy  on  the  spread  should  weaken  as  the  commercial  paper  market 
“deepens”  over  time.  Thus,  while  monetary  policy  may  still  have  a  strong 
impact  on  economic  activity,  the  link  between  monetary  policy  and  the 
paper-bill  spread  should  have  diminished  in  the  1980s.  In  fact,  Bernanke 
(1990)  shows  that  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on  the  spread  weakens  but  does 
not  disappear  after  1978.  He  argues  that  this  finding  provides  evidence  for 
the  imperfect  substitutability  hypothesis  over  the  credit  crunch  hypothesis 
because  the  latter  suggests  the  link  between  the  paper-bill  spread  and 
monetary  policy  should  have  been  completely  broken  following  the  removal  of 
7 Regulation  Q  in  the  late  1970s. 
3.  The  Cash-Flow  Hypothesis 
A  third  explanation  for  the  strong  performance  of  the  paper-bill  spread 
as  a  predictor  of  economic  activity  is  that  the  spread  responds  to  cyclical 
cash  flow  needs  of  corporations.  According  to  Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1993), 
the  spread  may  rise  at  cyclical  peaks  and  remain  high  during  recessions 
because  contractions  in  product  demand  associated  with  recessions  cause 
inventories  to  accumulate,  thus  increasing  firms’  operating  costs  and  reducing 
their  cash  flow.  As  firms  turn  to  the  credit  markets  to  finance  the  cash  flow 
shortage,  upward  pressure  is  placed  on  both  loan  and  commercial  paper  rates. 
Friedman  and  Kuttner  provide  evidence  for  the  cash-flow  hypothesis.  They 
show  that  the  paper-bill  spread  is  positively  correlated  to  lagged  growth  in 
the  proportion  of  commercial  paper  to  the  total  amount  of  paper  and  bills 
outstanding  and  negatively  correlated  to  the  proportion  of  Treasury  bills 
outstanding.  These  findings  suggest  that  investors  regard  commercial  paper 
and  Treasury  bills  as  imperfect  portfolio  substitutes,  providing  support  for 
the  cash-flow  and  monetary  hypotheses.  However,  they  also  show  that  the 
paper-bill  spread  is  positively  correlated  with  both  the  percentage  change  in 
a)  commercial  paper  issued  by  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector,  and  b)  bank 
loans  to  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector.  The  monetary  hypotheses  predict 
only  that  the  first  correlation  will  be  positive,  while  the  cash-flow 
hypothesis  predicts  that  both  will  be  positive. 
4.  The  Liquidity  Hypothesis 
Both  the  monetary  and  cash-flow  hypotheses  emphasize  the  role  of  paper 
supply  in  determination  of  the  paper-bill  spread.  The  liquidity  hypothesis  is 
similar  to  the  default-risk  hypothesis  in  that  it  focuses  on  the  demand  side 
8 of  the  paper  and  bill  markets.  According  to  Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1993),  the 
paper-bill  spread  may  rise  prior  to  and  during  recessions  because  economic 
contractions  lead  to  increased  investor  uncertainty  about  cash  flow  which,  in 
turn,  causes  them  to  value  liquidity  more  highly.  In  essence,  their  argument 
implies  a  causal  mechanism  running  from  the  real  economy,  to  uncertainty,  to 
the  paper-bill  spread.9 
A  microeconomic  foundation  for  the  liquidity  hypothesis  is  provided  by 
Jones  and  Ostroy  (1984).  Employing  a  sequential  decision  model,  they  show 
that  an  asset’s  liquidity  (defined  as  the  inverse  of  the  cost  of  switching 
from  that  asset  fo  another  asset)  provides  value  to  risk-neutral  investors 
because  it  permits  them  to  profitably  exploit  new  information.  In  addition, 
they  demonstrate  that  increases  in  uncertainty  about  factors  that  influence 
the  relative  yields  of  assets  raise  the  demand  for  liquid  assets  relative  to 
illiquid  ones.  When  uncertainty  increases,  the  information  content  of  future 
news  rises  and  investors  attempt  to  increase  the  liquidity  of  their  portfolio 
to  take  advantage  of  the  accelerated  pace  of  learning  expected  to  occur  in  the 
near- term. 
In  the  context  of  the  portfolio  decision  involving  paper  and  bills,  the 
Jones-Ostroy  model  predicts  that  increased  uncertainty  will  raise  the  paper- 
bill  spread  as  long  as  Treasury  bills  have  greater  liquidity  than  commercial 
paper.  In  fact,  bills  have  been  much  more  liquid  than  paper  over  most  of  the 
post-war  period.  For  instance,  bid-ask  spread  for  bills,  a  common  measure  of 
liquidity,  10  has  been  very  low;  reaching  levels  of  around  two  to  four  basis 
points  during  the  early  and  mid  1980s.’  1  In  contrast,  very  little  commercial 
paper  was  traded  in  the  secondary  market  until  recently.  Instead,  liquidity 
in  the  paper  market  has  been  provided  by  arrangements  which  allow  investors  to 
sell  paper  back  to  dealers  or  the  direct  issuer  if  a  sudden  need  for  funds 
arises.  However,  dealers  and  direct  issuers  have  no  legal  obligation  to  buy back  paper  and  the  cost  charged  for  this  service  -  the  bid  premium  -  has 
been  approximately  12  basis  points.  This  state  of  affairs  has  changed  in 
recent  years  with  the  development  of  an  active  secondary  market  for  commercial 
paper  and  bid  premia  falling  to  about  five  basis  points. 
12 
The  only  direct  empirical  evidence  for  the  liquidity  hypothesis  is 
Friedman  and  Kuttner’s  finding  that  there  is  a  negative  and  significant  time 
trend  in  regression  equations  for  the  paper-bill  spread.  This  finding 
suggests  that  the  paper-bill  spread  has  fallen  over  time  in  response  to  the 
increasing  relative  liquidity  of  the  commercial  paper  market. 
III.  A  Simple  Model  for  the  Paper-bill  Spread 
In  this  section  we  construct  a  reduced-form  model  for  the  paper-bill 
spread  using  the  four  hypotheses  to  guide  us  in  the  specification  of  supply 
and  demand  for  paper  and  bills.  By  modeling  the  paper-bill  spread  this  way  we 
can  formulate  predictions  about  the  impact  that  changes  in  the  liquidity  and 
default  characteristics  of  commercial  paper  have  on  the  responsiveness  of  the 
spread  to  its  determinants.  Two  important  findings  emerge.  First,  growing 
insolvency  or  illiquidity  of  borrowers  in  the  paper  market  should  strengthen 
the  relationship  between  the  spread  and  default  risk.  Second,  increases  in 
the  relative  liquidity  of  paper  should  decrease  the  sensitivity  of  the  spread 
to  changes  in  monetary  policy  or  uncertainty. 
The  supply  and  demand  for  Treasury  bills  are  expressed,  respectively,  as 
(1)  B:  =  a0  -  a1rt3,1  +  E, 
(2)  By =  b.  +  bIr,, 
where  r B  t  is  the  Treasury 
is  nonborrowed  reserves  (a 
-  b&  ,+  1  -, 
b3NBR,  +  b4DRISK,  +  b50t  +  u 
L 
bill  yield;  r ,,  L  is  the  commercial  paper  rate;  NBR 
L 
potential  measure  of  monetary  policy);  DRISKl  is 
10 default 
ut  are 
rate  to 
risk;  CY, is  uncertainty;  a  ,  al,  b  ,...,  bj  are  parameters;  and  E[  and  0  0 
disturbance  terms.  Bill  supply  is  expressed  as  a  function  of  the  bill 
allow  for  the  possibility  that  the  supply  of  the  government’s  debt  is 
not  strictly  exogenous.  Bill  demand  is  influenced  by  the  commercial  paper 
rate  because  bills  and  paper  are  substitutes  in  investors  portfolios.  The 
greater  the  substitutability  between  paper  and  bills,  the  larger  is  b2.  Both 
default  risk  and  uncertainty  have  a  positive  impact  on  bill  demand.  Bill 
demand  is  a  positive  function  of  nonborrowed  reserves  because  bills  are 
purchased  by  the  Federal  Reserve  during  open  market  operations.  This 
specification  is  chosen  to  explore  the  theoretical  possibility  -  discussed 
in  the  previous  section  -  that  policy  does  not  have  and  unambiguous  impact 
on  the  paper-bill  spread. 
Supply  and  demand  for  commercial  paper  are  expressed,  respectively,  as 
(3) 
(4) 
Pr  =  c  -  clrl,  L  - 
0  c2NBRL  +  c31NV,  +  4, 
p:’  =  do  +  dlrl,  I  -  d2rll  L  d3DRISKL  d  cs  +  3  1  TJ 
1 
where  INV,  is  the  level  of  inventories;  c  ,...,  cg,  d  ,...,  d4  are  parameters;  0  0 
and  5,  and  ‘r~  L  are  disturbance  terms.  Nonborrowed  reserves  have  a  negative 
impact  on  paper  supply  due  to  the  monetary  channel  emphasized  by  Kashyap  et 
al.  (1993).  Inventories  have  a  positive  effect  on  paper  supply  according  to 
the  cash  flow  hypothesis  of  Friedman  and  Kurtner  (1993).  Once  again,  the 
substitutability  between  paper  and  bills  is  modeled  by  including  the  bill  rate 
as  a  determinant  of  paper  demand.  Finally,  both  default  risk  and  uncertainty 
have  a  negative  impact  on  paper  demand. 
Setting  supply  equal  to  demand  in  each 
equations 
market,  we  get  the  following  two 
11 (6)  rp  t  =  F&  + [cl  “:  di]‘il.,  -  (,I’:  dl)NBRL  +  (&]iNvL 
+  [&]DRrSK,  +  (i+%-d+,  +  (~1  :  ,,)(c,-  11,) 
Substituting  (6)  into  (S),  we  obtain  the  bill  rate  consistent  with 
simultaneous  equilibrium  in  the  bill  and  paper  markets.  This  rate  can  then  be 
inserted  into  either  (5)  or  (6)  to  solve  for  the  equilibrium  paper  rate.  The 
equilibrium  bill  rate  is  then  subtracted  from  the  equilibrium  bill  rate  to 
produce  the  following  reduced-form  equation  for  the  paper-bill  spread 
(7)  rpt-rBt  =  a+  h.DRISKL  +  yINVL  -  P.NBR,  +  x.0  I 
+  z 
t  the  where  zL  is  an  amalgamation  of  the  structural  shocks.  If  we  assume  tha 
exogenous  variables  affect  the  markets  in  a  symmetric  fashion  (i.e.,  b4  = 
b5  =  d4  and  b3  =  c2),  and  that  the  bill  (paper)  rate  elasticity  of  bill 
(paper)  demand  is  equal  to  the  bill  (paper)  rate  elasticity  of  paper  (bill) 
d 
3’ 
demand  (i.e.,  b 
1  =  d2  and  b2  =  d,),13  then  the  reduced-form  parameters  can  be 
written  as: 
-  do 
a  =  $&  + 
(a0  -  b”)(cl  +  dl)  +  bz(co  -  do) 
i  ( 
d2  -  CI  -  dl 
al  +  1  b  )(CI  +  dl)  -  b 2d2  ] (  cl  +  dl  ) 
h  =  d3.  ai  +  cl 
al.cl  +  al.  bz  +  cid2)  >  0 
12 y  =  c3* 
al  +  bl 
al.cl  +  a I.bz  +  cd2) 
>  0 
n  =  d4. 
a1  +  Cl 
al.cl  +  al  .b2  +  cl.dz)  >  0 
Each  slope  parameter  is  unambiguously  positive  with  the  exception  of  the 
parameter  for  nonborrowed  reserves.  In  the  context  of  the  model,  the 
sufficient  conditions  for  restrictive  monetary  policy  to  have  a  positive 
impact  on  the  paper-bill  spread  in  this  model  is  for  substitutability  to  be 
symmetric  (i.e.,  b2  =  d2)  and  for  paper  supply  to  be  less  elastic  than  bill 
supply  (i.e.,  a,  >  cl).  Of  course,  if  monetary  policy  actions  do  not  affect 
bill  demand  directly  (e.g.,  the  discount  rare  is  changed),  Fed  tightening 
unambiguously  increases  the  paper-bill  spread. 
From  the  investors  perspective,  two  of  the  primary  characteristics  which 
distinguish  paper  from  bills  is  their  relative  liquidity  and  default  risk.  As 
these  two  characteristics  change,  the  responsiveness  of  the  paper-bill  spread 
to  the  exogenous  factors  also  changes.  For  example,  consider  what  happens 
when  the  relative  illiquidity  of  paper  falls.  Increased  liquidity  of  paper 
lowers  the  parameter  x  in  (7)  because  investors  view  paper  and  bills  as  closer 
substitutes  and  thus  their  demand  for  the  two  assets  becomes  less  sensitive  to 
uncertainty  (i.e.,  b5  and  d4  fall).  Also,  b?  and  d2  both  rise  as  paper  and 
bills  become  closer  substitutes.  This  also  reduces  x  as  can  be  observed  by 
assuming  symmetric  substitutability  and  considering  the  following  derivative: 
-d4(al  +  ~1)~ 
$2  =  [alcl  +  (a~  +  cl)d2J2  <  0 
Thus  greater  substitutability  between  paper  and  bills  increases  the  arbitrage 
13 activity  across  the  markets  and  reduces  the  impact  that  uncertainty  has  on  the 
paper-bill  spread. 
Next,  consider  what  happens  to  the  reduced-form  parameters  when  the 
default  risk  of  paper  rises.  There  are  two  principal  sources  of  default  risk. 
First,  the  probability  that  the  typical  firm  will  default  rises  when  product 
demand  and  revenue  is  expected  to  fall.  This  is  the  source  of  default  risk 
focused  on  in  the  literature  (and  embodied  in  DRISK)  because  it  explains  the 
predictive  power  of  the  paper-bill  spread.  Second,  given  a  fixed  level  of 
expected  demand,  the  probability  of  default  increases  with  a  firm’s  leverage 
ratio  and  the  percentage  of  its  cash  flow  committed  to  interest  rate  payments. 
Thus,  investors  will  view  the  substitutability  of  paper  and  bills  to  be  lower 
if  the  financial  fragility  of  firms  increases.  If  DRISK  only  measures  the 
first  source  of  default  risk,  then  increased  financial  fragility  causes  b4  and 
d3  to  rise  which  increases  the  reduced-form  parameter  h  in  (7).  Moreover,  b2 
and  d2  both  fall  -  in  contrast  to  what  we  observed  in  the  previous  example 
-  as  the  substitutability  of  bills  and  paper  declines.  This  raises  the 
value  of  h  further  as  we  see  from  the  following  derivative: 
ah  -ds(al  +  ~1)~ 
XI2  =  [alcl  +  (al  +  cl)dz] 
2  c  0 
Thus  greater  financial  fragility  of  firms  in  the  aggregate  reduces  arbitrage 
activity  across  markets  and  increases  the  impact  that  default  risk  has  on  the 
paper-bill  spread. 
Finally,  increases  in  the  relative  liquidity  of  paper  and  greater 
financial  fragility  of  firms  have  offsetting  effects  on  the  responsiveness  of 
the  paper-bill  spread  to  changes  in  monetary  policy  and  inventories.  A  rise 
in  d2  causes  p  and  y  to  fall  if  the  sufficient  conditions  for  p  >  0  are  met. 
However,  increases  in  the  liquidity  of  paper  make  paper  and  bills  closer 
substitutes,  while  greater  financial  fragility  has  the  opposite  effect.  Thus 
4 it  is  not  clear  what  impact  these  changes  will  have  on  d1  and  thus  p  and  y. 
IV.  Measurement Issues 
To  measure  default  risk,  we  follow  the  existing  literature  and  use  the 
difference  between  yields  on  medium  (A-2  and  P-2)  and  high-grade  (A-l  and  P- 1) 
commercial  paper.  14  This  quality  spread  (QUALITY)  is  shown  in  Figure  2.  The 
assumption  made  when  using  the  quality  spread  to  measure  default  risk  is  that 
new  information  about  business  cycle  conditions  is  reflected  in  investor 
demand  for  medium-  and  high-grade  paper  before  rating  agencies  can  down-  or 
upgrade  firms.  In  contrast,  the  quality  spread  does  not  reflect  changes  in 
the  level  of  financial  fragility  if  the  rating  agencies  can  identify  firms 
with  changing  financial  structure  so  that  the  relative  strength  of  balance 
sheets  for  high-  and  medium-grade  borrowers  does  not  change  over  time.  1s 
Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1992)  have  argued  that  the  federal  funds  rate  (ff) 
was  a  good  indicator  of  monetary  policy  prior  to  October  1979  when  the  Federal 
Reserve  was  targeting  this  rate.  The  Federal  Reserve  allowed  the  funds  rate 
to  adjust  to  demand  shocks  in  the  market  for  reserves  between  October  1979  and 
October  1982,  and  thus  it  may  not  provide  an  accurate  gauge  of  monetary  policy 
for  this  period.  Presumably,  the  funds  rate  was  a  better  indicator  of  policy 
in  the  post-November  1982  period  when  the  Federal  Reserve  returned  to  a  policy 
of  smoothing  short-term  interest  rate  movements.  16  An  alternative  measure  of 
the  monetary  policy  is  the  level  of  nonborrowed  reserves  (NBR).  Unlike  the 
funds  rate,  nonborrowed  reserves  are  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Federal 
Reserve.  l7 
To  measure  inventories,  we  use  the  level  of  end-of-month  manufacturing 
and  trade  inventories  in  1982  dollars  (INV).  This  is  the  broadest  measure  of 
inventories  available  on  a  monthly  basis. 
Two  different  approaches  are  employed  to  measure  uncertainty.  The  first 
15 uses  the  volatility  of  daily  interest  rate  changes  and  stock  price  returns 
over  the  month.  Following  Roley  and  Troll  (1983),  interest  rate  volatility  is 
estimated  by  the  root  mean  squared  error  for  the  yield 
(8)  RMSE  = 
1 
where  Ai:  t  is  the  squared  change  in  the  yield  between  day  j  and  day  j-l  of 
month  t  and  Nt  is  the  number  of  trading  days  in  month  t.  Two  different  yields 
are  considered:  the  federal  funds  rate  and  the  yield  on  three-month  Treasury 
bills.  The  first  provides  us  with  a  rate  that  the  Federal  Reserve  has  some 
control  over,  while  the  second  is  an  open  market  rate  that  is  influenced  by 
inflationary  expectations.  The  root  mean  squared  errors  for  the  federal  funds 
and  Treasury  bill  rate  are  denoted  by  FFRMSE  and  TBRMSE  respectively  and  are 
shown  in  Figures  3. 
Following  Merton  (19X0),  and  French,  Schwert  and  Stambaugh  (19X7),  we  use 
daily  returns  on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  value-weighted  Index  (inclusive 
of  distributions)  to  estimate  monthly  standard  deviations  of  stock  market 
returns.  In  particular,  we  estimate 
(9) 
IIL 
NYSESD  = 
t 
where  ri  t  is  the  return  for  day  i  of  month  t.  This  measure  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  4. 18  The  extremely  high  level  of  volatility  in  October  1987  has  been 
removed  from  the  Figure  -  but  not  from  the  series  used  in  the  analysis  - 
so  that  fluctuations  in  the  series  can  be  better  visualized. 
The  second  set  of  uncertainty  measures  are  constructed  using  survey  data 
on  macroeconomic  forecasts.  According  to  Zarnowitz  and  Lambros  (1987),  the 
dispersion  of  forecasts  across  a  group  of  forecasters  -  forecaster  discord 
-  provides  a  good  estimate  of  the  collective  level  of  uncertainty 
16 experienced  by  the  group.  We  use  forecasts  made  each  month  by  a  group  of 
economists  who  participate  in  a  survey  conducted  by  the  Blue  Chip  Economic 
Indicator  forecasting  service  to  estimate  forecaster  discord.  19 
The  discord  measures  are  constructed  by  estimating  the  cross-forecaste 
standard  deviation  of  point  forecasts  made  each  month  for  the  i)  AAA  corporate 
bond  rate,  and  ii)  industrial  production  growth  rate.  Because  the  forecast 
target  date  changes  only  once  a  year,  the  length  of  the  forecast  horizon 
changes  each  month.  20  Given  this  feature  of  the  data,  the  standard  deviations 
of  point  forecasts  should  be  higher,  on  average,  in  months  where  the  forecast 
horizon  is  further  into  the  future.  To  remove  this  source  of  discord 
variability,  the  standard  deviation  of  forecasts  irl  each  month  is  divided  by 
the  average  value  of  the  standard  deviation  for  that  particular  month  taken 
over  the  entire  sample  period. 
Long-term  interest  rate  discord  (LTRDISC)  and  industrial  production 
discord  (IPDISC)  are  illustrated  in  Figures  5  and  6.  Note  that  interest  rate 
discord,  as  well  as  interest  rate  volatility  illustrated  in  Figure  3,  reached 
high  levels  between  the  end  of  1979  and  1982.  A  broad  consensus  has  emerged 
among  researchers  that  the  nonborrowed  reserve  operating  procedure  employed  by 
the  Federal  Reserve  during  this  period  contributed  to  the  interest  rate 
uncertainty.  21 
V.  Is  the  Quality  Spread  Measuring  Default  Risk  Exclusively? 
Before  proceeding  to  examine  the  determinants  of  the  paper-bill  spread, 
it  is  important  to  consider  whether  the  quality  spread  responds  exclusively  to 
perceived  default  risk.  This  examination  is  motivated  by  two  observations. 
First,  the  volume  of  high-grade  commercial  paper  outstanding  was  about  four 
times  the  volume  of  medium-grade  paper  as  of  the  mid-1980s.  thus  suggesting 
that  high-grade  paper  is  more  liquid  than  medium-grade  paper. 22  Second,  the 
17 liquidity  hypothesis  suggests  that  the  spread  between  yields  on  any  two  assets 
should  be  sensitive  to  uncertainty  if  the  liquidity  of  these  assets  differs  to 
a  significant  degree.  Thus  it  is  possible  that  a  part  of  the  commercial  paper 
quality  spread  is  actually  a  liquidity  premium  that  responds  to  fluctuations 
in  uncertainty. 
To  investigate  this  hypothesis,  the  quality  spread  was  regressed  on  the 
five  uncertainty  proxies.  The  results  from  these  regressions  are  presented  in 
Table  1.  They  demonstrate  that  each  of  the  uncertainty  measures  has  a 
positive  and  statistically  significant  impact  on  the  quality  spread.  In  fact, 
the  R-squareds  exceed  30  percent  in  three  out  of  the  five  regressions.  This 
finding  suggests  that  a  significant  proportion  of  the  quality  spread’s 
variation  over  time  can  be  explained  by  an  uncertainty-driven  liquidity 
premium.  23 
To  purge  the  quality  spread  of  the  liquidity  premium  and  obtain  a  measure 
of  default  risk,  we  use  the  residuals  from  the  regressions  in  Table  1.  Figure 
2  illustrates  the  residual  from  model  2.  The  quality  spread  and  the  residual 
are  highly  correlated  with  some  notable  exceptions.  For  instance,  it  appears 
that  the  quality  spread  is  driven  by  uncertainty  and  a  liquidity  premium  in 
the  period  from  mid-  1980  through  1981,  while  its  I  -ise  in  1974  and  1982  is 
attributable  mainly  to  increases  in  default  risk. 
VI.  The  Paper-Bill  Spread  and  Its  Determinants 
Tables  2  through  4  present  estimates  for  the  reduced-form  models  for  the 
paper-bill  spread.  The  regressions  in  Table  2  employ  nonborrowed  reserves  to 
measure  the  stance  of  monetary  policy,  while  regressions  in  Tables  3  and  4 
use,  respectively,  the  6month  Treasury  bill  rate  (and  nonborrowed  reserves) 
and  the  federal  funds  rate.  Each  Table  contains  five  different  regressions, 
one  for  each  of  the  uncertainty  measures  discussed  above.  The  sample  periods 
18 are  dictated  by  data  availability. 
Because  the  error  terms  from  the  models  estimated  with  ordinary  least 
squares  exhibit  significant  first-order  autocorrelation,  generalized  least 
squares  was  employed.  In  particular,  the  Beach-MacKinnon  Maximum  likelihood 
procedure  was  used  to  simultaneously  estimate  the  autocorrelation  coefficient, 
p,  and  the  models’  other  parameters.  Each  Table  contains  several  diagnostic 
statistics.  The  Ljung-Box  statistic,  Q(12),  tests  the  hypothesis  that  the 
first  12  autocorrelation  coefficients  for  the  estimated  residuals  are  jointly 
equal  to  zero.  This  statistic  has  a  chi-squared  distribution  with  12  degrees 
of  freedom.  WHITE(k)  is  the  statistic  suggested  by  White  (1980)  to  test  the 
null  hypothesis  of  a  homoskedastic  error  process.  It  is  also  distributed  as  a 
chi-squared  and  has  k  degrees  of  freedom.  When  autocorrelation  and/or 
heteroskedasticity  is  present  in  the  error  process,  the  t-statistics  were 
constructed  using  White’s  (1980)  and  Hansen’s  (1982)  heteroskedasticity-  and 
autoregressive-consistent  standard  errors,  with  4  Iags  of  the  residuals  and  a 
dampening  factor  of  1.0. 
To  facilitate  comparison  of  the  coefficients,  each  variable  was 
standardized  by  adding  it  to  the  negative  of  its  sample  mean  and  then 
dividing  by  the  sample  standard  deviation.  Thus  the  resulting  parameter 
estimates  are  beta  coefficients;  they  show  the  number  of  standard  error 
changes  in  the  dependent  variable  resultin, ‘1 from  a  one  standard  error  change 
in  an  explanatory  variable. 
A.  Policy  Meusured  by  Nonborrowed  Reserves 
The  results  in  Table  2  do  not  provide  uniform  support  for  the  four 
hypotheses  discussed  above.  Of  the  three  that  have  already  been  examined 
empirically  in  the  literature  (i.e.,  the  default-risk,  monetary  and  cash-flow 
hypotheses),  the  strongest  support  is  provided  for  the  cash  tlow  hypothesis. 
19 This  conclusion  is  based  on  the  finding  that  inventories  have  a  significant 
positive  impact  on  the  paper-bill  spread  in  each  of  the  five  specifications 
and  the  beta  coefficients  are  well  above  one  in  each  case. 
Support  is  also  provided  for  the  default-risk  hypothesis.  The 
coefficient  on  the  quality  spread,  purged  of  the  liquidity  premium,  is 
consistently  positive  and  significantly  different  from  zero  in  each  model. 
However,  the  relatively  small  coefficients  on  the  quality  spread  (i.e.,  they 
are  approximately  one-fifth  the  size  of  the  those  on  inventories)  suggest  that 
the  impact  of  default  risk  is  less  powerful  than  the  impact  of  inventory 
movements. 
Table  2  provides  little 
coefficients  on  nonborrowed 
support  for  the  monetary  hypothesis.  While  the 
reserves  are  generally  negative  as  the  hypothesis 
predicts,  they  are  far  from  significant.  Moreover,  the  parameters  are 
unstable  across  the  models,  ranging  from  -1.007  to  .097.  Either  nonborrowed 
reserves  do  not  reflect  the  stance  of  monetary  policy,  or  the  latter  does  not 
have  a  strong  impact  on  the  paper-bill  spread. 
The  most  novel  finding  presented  in  Table 
documented  between  the  uncertainty  proxies  and 
the  uncertainty  proxies  has  a  positive  coefficient 
2  is  the  strong  relationship 
the  paper-bill  spread.  Each  of 
that  is  significant  at  the 
one  percent  level  or  better.  In  addition,  coefficients  on  the  three  interest 
rate  uncertainty  proxies  are  larger  than  those  for  the  quality  spread.  The 
fact  that  these  results  hold  when  uncertainty  is  measured  by  both  financial 
market  volatility  and  forecaster  discord  suggests  that  the  evidence  for  the 
liquidity  hypothesis  is  robust. 
B.  Policy  Measured  by  Nonborrowed  Reserves 
and  the  Level  of  Market  Rates 
As  discussed  in  section  11, the  paper-bill  spread  should  be  positively 
correlated  with  the  level  of  market  rates  when  interest  earned  on  paper  and 
20 bills  is  subject  to  differential  taxation.  To  the  extent  that  restrictive 
monetary  policy  raises  all  market  rates,  the  finding  of  a  positive  link 
between  the  level  of  rates  and  the  paper-bill  spread  provides  support  for  the 
monetary  hypotheses.  To  examine  this  issue  empirically,  models  in  Table  2 
were  re-estimated  with  the  level  of  the  &month  Treasury  bill  rate  (TBG) 
included  as  an  additional  determinant.  24  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  3. 
In  several  respects,  the  results  in  Table  3  are  consistent  with  those  in 
Table  2.  Inclusion  of  the  interest  rate  level  does  not  greatly  alter  the 
magnitude  or  statistical  significance  of  the  quality  spread  coefficient,  while 
the  size  and  statistical  significance  of  the  coefficient  on  inventories  falls 
by  a  relatively  small  amount.  In  contrast,  the  coefficient  on  nonborrowed 
reserves  switches  sign  and  in  three  cases  (models  2,  4  and  5)  is  statistically 
significant.  This  result  contradicts  the  monetary  hypothesis  and  is  difficult 
to  explain.  Interestingly,  the  &month  Treasury  bill  rate  has  a  significant 
positive  effect  on  the  paper-bill  spread  in  each  of  the  models.  This  result 
provides  support  for  the  monetary  hypothesis.  Finally,  the  uncertainty 
proxies  continue  to  have  a  significant  positive  impact  on  the  paper-bill 
spread  in  each  of  the  models  except  model  4.  The  latter  result  may  be  due  to 
multicollinearity  between  interest  rate  discord  and  the  level  of  the  6-month 
Treasury  bill  rate.  Nevertheless,  the  results  confirm  the  earlier  conclusion 
that  uncertainty  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  paper-bill  spread. 
C.  Policy  Measured  by  the  Federal  Frmds  Rute 
Given  the  conflicting  findings  about  the  empirical  relevance  of  monetary 
policy,  we  consider  one  final  measure  of  policy:  the  federal  funds  rate. 
Table  4  provides  results  for  models  that  use  this  variable.  The  Table  shows 
that  inventories  and  default  risk  play  a  somewhat  diminished  role  in 
explaining  the  paper-bill  spread  when  the  federal  funds  rate  is  included  in 
21 the  models.  Moreover,  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficients  on  the  uncertainty 
proxies  declines  somewhat  in  Table  4,  although  each  remains  significant  at  the 
five  percent  level  or  higher.  Finally,  note  that  the  federal  funds  rate  has  a 
positive  impact  on  the  paper-bill  spread  in  each  of  the  models  and  that  its 
coefficient  is  highly  significant.  To  the  extent  that  the  federal  funds  rate 
is  an  accurate  indicator  of  monetary  policy,  the  results  in  Table  4  provide 
strong  evidence  in  favor  of  the  monetary  hypotheses. 
The  finding  that  federal  funds  rate  volatility  affects  the  paper-bill 
spread  in  Tables  2  through  4  has  important  policy  implications.  It  is  well 
understood  that  the  Federal  Reserve  influences  the  costs  firms  ultimately  pay 
for  bank  credit  by  impacting  the  price  for  reserves.  However,  the  results 
presented  above  suggest  that  the  Federal  reserve  can  also  affect  the  cost  of 
non-bank  credit  by  stabilizing  the  federal  funds  rate  and  reducing  financial 
market  risk.  As  we  have  seen  over  the  past  20  years,  the  Federal  Reserve 
capable  of  dramatically  reducing  federal  funds  rate  volatility  by  targeting 
the  funds  rate.  By  limitin, (y financial  market  risk,  the  Fed  reduces  the 
incentive  for  investors  to  hold  liquid  assets  and  thus  lowers  the  liquidity 
premium  firms  must  pay  to  access  capital  in  the  open  market. 
is 
VII.  Has  the  Relationship  Between  the  Paper-Bill  Spread  and 
its  Determinants  changed  in  Recent  Years? 
As  many  commentators  have  noted,  several  major  developments  in  U.S. 
financial  markets  occurred  during  the  1980s.  For  the  purpose  of  explaining 
the  changing  relationship  between  the  paper-bill  spread  and  its  determinants, 
we  focus  on  two  of  these  developments.  The  first  is  the  dramatic  growth  of 
the  commercial  paper  market.  This  growth  cm  be  seen  in  Figure  7  which  shows 
the  ratio  of  total  commercial  paper  outstanding  to  outstandings  of  Treasury 
securities  with  less 
this  growth  is  that 
than  one  year  to  maturity.  One  important  implication  of 
the  relative  illicluidity  of  paper  has  -  from  the 
22 investor’s  perspective  -  declined.  25 
The  second  feature  of  U.S.  financial  markets  that  has  received  attention 
is  the  deteriorating  balance  sheets  of  corporations  during  the  1980s.  For 
example,  Bernanke  and  Campbell  (1988)  point  out  that  corporate  debt  burdens, 
measured  on  a  current  basis,  rose  sharply  during  the  1980s  as  a  larger 
proportion  of  firms’  cash  flows  were  committed  to  interest  payments.  This 
secular  rise  in  debt  burdens  is  illustrated  in  Figure  8  which  shows  the  ratio 
of  net  interest  payments  to  profits.  26  One  important  implication  of  this  rise 
in  financial  fragility  is  that  a  given  negative  economic  shock  should  have 
been  expected  to  produce  a  greater  level  of  commercial  paper  defaults  in  the 
1980s  than  in  earlier  periods. 
The  theoretical  model  constructed  in  Section  III  suggests  that  the 
reduced-form  relationship  between  the  paper-bill  spread  and  its  determinants 
should  have  been  altered  by  these  developments.  In  particular,  increased 
relative  liquidity  of  paper  causes  investors  to  view  paper  and  bills  as  close1 
substitutes  and  weakens  the  impact  that  uncertainty  has  on  the  paper-bill 
spread.  On  the  other  hand,  greater  financial  fragility  of  commercial  paper 
issuers  reduces  the  substitutability  of  paper  and  bills  and  makes  the  spread 
more  sensitive  to  changes  in  default  risk.  How  the  impact  of  monetary  policy 
and  inventories  changes  depends  on  the  net  effect  of  these  two  developments  on 
the  substitutability  between  paper  and  bills. 
To  determine  whether  there  has  been  a  structural  shift  in  the 
relationship  between  the  paper-bill  spread  and  its  determinants,  Chow  tests 
were  performed  on  the  models  presented  in  Tables  2  through  4.  The  test 
statistics  was  constructed  in  the  following  manner.  First,  the  sample  period 
was  divided  into  two  equal-sized  [approximately)  sub-samples;  the  first  runs 
from  January  1974  to  December  1982  and  the  second  runs  from  January  1983  to 
June  1991.  Then  a  dummy  variable  was  created  that  takes  on  values  of  zero  in 
23 the  first  sub-sample  and  one  in  the  second.  Next,  this  dummy  variable  was 
multiplied  by  each  of  the  models’  explanatory  variables  and  these  interacted 
variables  were  introduced  into  the  specifications.  Evidence  for  structural 
change  is  obtained  if  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients 
on  the  dummy  and  interacted  variables  are  jointly  equal  to  zero.  The  last  row 
of  Tables  2  through  4  shows  chi-squared  statistics,  denoted  by  CHOW(k)  where  k 
is  the  degrees  of  freedom,  used  to  test  the  joint  significance  of  these 
coefficients. 
A  striking  finding  presented  in  Tables  2  through  4  is  that  the  Chow 
statistics  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  five  percent  level  or 
better  in  each  of  the  models  estimated  with  the  exception  of  model  5  in  Table 
4.  These  results  allow  us  to  reject  the  hypothesis  of  parameter  stability, 
suggesting  that  the  relationship  between  the  paper-bill  and  its  determinants 
changed  over  the  sample  period. 
To  investigate  how  the  relationship  between  the  paper-bill  spread  and  its 
determinants  has  changed,  we  employ  the  Kalman  filter  to  estimate  the  reduced- 
form  parameters  from  (7).  The  Kalman  filter  is  an  algorithm  for  sequentially 
updating  parameter  estimates  and  provides  us  with  the  flexibility  to  specify 
different  transition  processes  for  the  parameter  vector.  We  chose  a  general 
specification  with  random  walk  parameter  variation.  Given  the  findings  of 
heteroskedasticity  in  the  previous  section,  the  variance  of  the  regression 
disturbance  term  is  also  allowed  to  vary  over  time.  initial  estimates  for  the 
parameters  were  obtained  by  estimating  the  models  over  the  1974  to  1976 
period.  The  Kalman  filter  was  then  used  to  recursively  estimate  the 
parameters  for  the  remainder  of  the  sample.  The  relative  tightness  on  time 
variation  is  set  equal  to  one  so  that  all  past  data  is  given  equal  weight  in 
the  parameter  estimation. 
Figure  9  shows  the  behavior  of  the  four  key  parameters  from  model  1  of 
24 Table  2.  Panel  C  shows  that  the  coefficient  on  nonborrowed  reserves  takes  on 
large  negative  values  in  the  early  part  of  the  sample,  but  converges  to  zero 
by  1987.  This  finding  provides  evidence  that  the  influence  of  monetary  policy 
on  the  paper-bill  spread  diminished  greatly  over  the  1980s.  Interestingly, 
the  rapid  decline  in  the  absolute  size  of  this  coefficient  subsides 
temporarily  between  the  end  of  1979  and  1983;  the  period  when  the  Federal 
Reserve  used  nonborrowed  reserves  as  its  primary  policy  instrument.  This 
finding  suggests  that  a  partial  explanation  for  the  finding  of  a  weak 
reiationship  between  nonborrowed  reserves  and  the  paper-bill  spread  observed 
in  Table  2  is  that  nonborrowed  reserves  are  not  a  precise  indicator  of 
monetary  policy  for  the  full  sample  period.  27 
Panel  D  shows  the  evolution  of  the  coefficient  for  federal  funds  rate 
volatility.  Note  that  the  absolute  size  of  this  coefficient  also  declines 
dramatically  over  the  sample  period.  The  coefficient  initially  has  a  value  of 
.57,  falls  somewhat  between  1978  and  1979,  increases  slightly  in  1981,  and 
then  declines  precipitously  beginning  in  19X6.  Overall,  the  downward  path  of 
this  coefficient  provides  evidence  that  uncertainty  had  an  increasingly 
smaller  impact  on  the  paper-bill  spread  over  the  1980s.  This  finding  is 
consistent  with  the  theoretical  prediction  that  increased  liquidity  of  the 
paper  market  should  attenuate  the  link  between  uncertainty  and  the  spread.  2x 
Unlike  the  nonborrowed  reserve  and  uncertainty  coefficients,  the  default 
risk  coefficient  in  panel  A  rose  by  a  considerable  amount  over  the  sample 
period.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  observation  that  the  financial 
fragility  of  commercial  paper  issuers  increased  over  the  1980s  so  that  the 
substitutability  between  paper  and  bills  declined  along  this  dimension. 
The  behavior  of  the  coefficient  on  inventories  in  panel  B  is  more 
difficult  to  account  for,  although,  as  we  see  below,  the  behavior  of  this 
coefficient,  unlike  the  other  ones,  is  not  stable  across  the  models. 
25 Also,  it  is  possible  that  the  recent  advent  of  just-in-time  inventory  control 
methods  has  obviated  the  link  between  inventories  and  commercial  paper 
issuance. 
Figures  10  through  12  illustrate  the  robustness  of  these  results  across 
the  different  specifications.  Figure  10,  which  is  from  model  3  of  Table  2, 
shows  several  interesting  results.  First,  the  coefficients  on  nonborrowed 
reserves  and  default  risk  continue  to  maintain  the  general  pattern  observed  in 
Figure  9.  Second,  the  coefficient  on  inventories  follows  a  steep  downward 
path  over  the  sample  and,  unlike  what  is  observed  in  Figure  9,  does  not  have 
a  large  spike  in  1987  and  1988.  Finally,  the  coefficient  on  stock  return 
volatility  declines  by  a  considerable  amount  during  the  1980s.  In  contrast  to 
the  coefficient  on  federal  funds  rate  volatility,  however,  the  coefficient  on 
stock  return  volatility  experiences  most  of  its  decline  in  1982. 
Figure  11  shows  the  coefficients  from  model  1  of  Table  4.  Similar  to 
what  we  observed  for  the  nonborrowed  reserves  coefficient,  the  coefficient  on 
the  federal  funds  rate  declines  a  great  deal  over  the  sample.  In  contrast  to 
the  coefficient  on  nonborrowed  reserves,  however,  the  decline  in  the  federal 
funds  rate  coefficient  is  much  sharper  and  takes  place  between  1979  and  198 1. 
It  could  be  argued  that  this  decline  simply  reflects  the  diminished  ability  of 
the  federal  funds  rate  to  capture  the  monetary  policy  stance  following  the 
change  in  operating  procedures  in  1979.  However,  if  this  were  the  case  then 
the  coefficient  should  rise  after  1982  when  the  Federal  Reserve  returned  to  a 
policy  of  targeting  the  federal  funds  rate.  This  does  not  occur.  Figure  11 
also  shows  the  instability  of  the  inventory  coefficient;  it  rises  over  the 
sample  period  rather  than  falling  as  we  observed  in  Figures  9  and  10. 
Finally,  note  that  the  coefficient  on  federal  funds  rate  volatility  falls  over 
the  sample  period  as  we  saw  earlier.  29 
Figure  12  shows  the  coefficients  from  model  3  of  table  4.  The  patterns 
26 displayed  in  this  Figure  are  generally  consistent  with  what  we  observed  in  the 
previous  three  Figures. 
Overall,  the  results  suggest  that  the  influence  of  monetary  policy  and 
30  uncertainty  on  the  paper-bill  spread  weakened  considerably  over  the  1980s.‘ 
This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  observation  that  the  relative  liquidity  of 
paper  rose  during  the  1980s  with  the  dramatic  increase  in  the  volume  of  paper 
traded  on  the  secondary  market.  In  contrast,  the  paper-bill  spread  has  become 
more  sensitive  to  changes  in  default  risk  during  this  time.  This  finding  is 
consistent  with  the  increasing  financial  fragility  of  commercial  paper  issuers 
during  the  1980s.  To  the  extent  that  information  in  the  paper-bill  spread 
concerning  the  stance  of  monetary  policy  and  uncertainty  is  more  informative 
about  future  economic  activity  than  is  information  about  default  risk,  these 
findings  explain  the  recent  decline  in  the  predictive  power  of  the  spread. 
VIII.  Conclusion  and  Policy  Implications 
This  paper  examined  the  determinants  of  the  paper-bill  spread.  In 
addition,  it  explored  the  role  that  major  financial  market  developments 
occurring  during  the  1980s  play  in  explaining  the  declining  predictive  power 
of  the  spread  observed  in  recent  years.  The  paper  provides  three  main 
findings. 
First,  consistent  with  previous  empirical  work  we  find  evidence  for  the 
default-risk,  monetary  and  cash-flow  hypotheses.  We  show  that  the  commercial 
paper  quality  spread  (purged  of  its  liquidity  premium  component),  various 
measures  of  monetary  policy,  and  manufacturin  g  inventories  impact  the  paper- 
bill  spread  in  a  manner  consistent  with  these  three  hypotheses. 
Second,  we  provide  new  evidence  that  uncertainty  is  an  important  force 
driving  the  paper-bill  spread.  This  result  holds  using  two  different  methods 
to  measure  uncertainty:  financial  market  volatility  and  forecaster  discord 
27 from  the  Blue  Chip  survey.  Moreover,  it  holds  for  uncertainty  measures  fog 
five  different  variables:  the  federal  funds  rate,  three-month  Treasury  bill 
rates,  long-term  bond  rates,  stock  returns,  and  industrial  production.  These 
findings  provide  support  for  the  liquidity  hypothesis  which  argues  that  the 
paper-bill  spread  provides  strong  predictive  power  for  economic  activity 
because  it  reflects,  in  part,  the  level  of  uncertainty  in  the  economy. 
Third,  the  paper  shows  that  the  impact  of  the  determinants  on  the  paper- 
bill  spread  is  not  time-invariant.  In  particular,  we  use  a  Kalman  filter 
model  to  show  that  the  paper-bill  spread  became  less  sensitive  to  movements  in 
monetary  policy  and  uncertainty  over  the  198Os,  while  default  risk  had  a 
greater  impact  on  the  spread  during  this  period.  This  finding  is  explained  by 
two  developments  occurring  in  U.S.  financial  markets  during  the  1980s:  1)  the 
rise  in  the  volume  and  liquidity  of  the  commercial  paper  market,  and  2)  the 
increased  financial  fragility  of  U.S.  corporations.  Moreover,  this  finding 
helps  us  to  understand  why  the  predictive  performance  of  the  paper-bill  spread 
has  deteriorated  in  recent  years.  That  is,  changing  financial  structure  has 
reduced  the  ability  of  the  spread  to  embody  important  information  about 
monetary  policy  and  uncertainty. 
Two  policy  implications  can  be  drawn  from  the  analysis.  First,  policy- 
makers  should  be  cautious  about  using  the  paper-bill  spread  as  an  instrument 
of  monetary  policy  given  the  sensitivity  of  its  ability  to  embody  important 
information  to  changing  financial  market  structure.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
possible  that  other  yield  spreads  may  continue  to  serve  as  useful  policy 
instruments.  As  established  security  markets  become  deeper  and  yields  in 
these  markets  are  driven  less  by  liquidity  considerations,  yields  on  assets 
traded  in  new  and  less  liquid  markets  (e.g.,  the  junk  bond  market)  may  contain 
liquidity  premia  that  provide  useful  information  about  the  economy.  This  is 
an  important  empirical  issue  that  should  be  explored  in  future  research. Second,  the  paper  provides  evidence  of  an  additional  channel  --  one 
that  has  received  little  attention  in  the  literature  -  through  which 
monetary  policy  affects  the  economy.  That  is,  monetary  policy  regimes  that  do 
not  offset  demand  shocks  to  reserves  and  allow  the  federal  funds  rate  to 
fluctuate  are  an  important  source  of  financial  market  uncertainty.  As  we  have 
seen,  this  uncertainty  affects  the  non-bank  cost  of  finance  by  driving  a  wedge 
between  yields  on  relatively  illiquid  open  market  credit  instruments  such  as 
commercial  paper  and  rates  on  liquid  assets.  By  targeting  the  federal  funds 
rate  and  limiting  this  uncertainty,  the  Federal  Reserve  can  reduce  the  cost  of 
credit  and  stimulate  investment  spending. Data  Appendix 
Quarterly  Data 
1.  Profits  before  taxes,  GDP  of  nonfinancial  corporations,  SAAR  (Citibase: 
GJPBT),  1974:Ql-  1991:Q2. 
2.  Net  Interest,  GDP  of  nonfinancial  corporations,  SAAR  (Citibase:  GJINT), 
1974:Ql-  1991:Q2. 
3.  Capital  Consumption  Allowances,  GDP  of  nonfinancial  corporations,  SAAR 
(Citibase:  GJCCAA),  1974:Ql-  1991:Q2. 
Monthly  Data 
1.  Six-month  commercial  paper  rate,  bank  discount  basis,  NSA  (Citibase:  FYCP), 
1974.1-1991.6. 
2.  Six-month  Treasury  bill  rate,  secondary  market,  NSA  (Citibase:  FYGM6), 
1974.1-1991.6. 
3.  Federal  funds  effective  rate,  NSA  (Citibase:  FYFF),  1974. l- 1991.6. 
4.  Nonborrowed  reserves  adjusted  for  extended  credit,  SA  (Citibase:  FMRNBC), 
1974.1-1991.6. 
5.  Inventories:  Manufacturing  and  Trade,  book  value,  eom,  19X2 dollars,  SA 
(Citibase:  IVMT82),  1974.1- 199 1.6 
6.  A-2/P-2  and  A- l/P-l  rated  commercial  paper  yields,  composite  of  30  day 
rates  provided  by  commercial  paper  dealers  to  the  Board  of  Governors  on 
each  Wednesday,  NSA  (Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System), 
1974.1-1991.6. 
7.  Volume  outstanding  of  total  commercial  paper  (Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System),  1974.1-  199 1.6. 
8.  Volume  outstanding  of  Treasury  securities  with  less  than  one  year  to 
maturity  (Tremury  Bdleth),  1974. l- 199 1.6. 
9.  AAA  Corporate  bond  rate  forecasts,  (Blue  Chip  Economic  ltdicutors,  Eggert 
Economic  Enterprises,  Inc.),  1976.8- 199 1.6. 
10.  Industrial  production  growth  forecasts,  (Blue  Chip  Ecormnic  It&mm, 
Eggert  Economic  Enterprises,  Inc.),  1977.9- 199 1  .h. 
Daily  Data 
1.  Secondary  market  yield  on  three-month  Treasury  bills,  discount  basis 
(Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Table  H. 15,  distributed  by  National  Technical 
Information  Services:  GFSMO3),  1974.1-  1991.6 
2.  Federal  funds  effective  rate  (Fe&t-d  Reserve  Bulleth,  Table  H.15, 
distributed  by  National  Technical  Information  Services:  PFF),  1974.7-  1991.6 
3.  Returns,  including  all  distributions,  on  the  value-weighted  NYSE  index 
(CRSP:  VWRETD),  1962.7-1991.6 References 
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 TABLE  1 
Explaining  Fluctuations 
in  the  Commercial  Paper  Quality  Spread 
Sample 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
74:1-91:6  74:1-91:6  74:1-91:6  76:8-91:6  77:10-91:6 
Constant  .251  .233  .308b  .500  .482 
(4.76)a  (4.11Ja  (2.04)  (24.38)a  (20.45ja 
FFRMSE  718 
u0:31ja 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
TBRMSE  .  .  .  2.55 
(12.22Ja 
. . .  . . .  . . . 
NYSESD  .  .  .  .  .  .  24.69  .  .  .  .  .  . 
(4.24)a 
LTRDISC  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .372  .  .  . 
(9.15jd 
IPDISC  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .546 
(6.16j3 
-2 
R  .33  .42  .07  .32  .18 
DW  .51  .44  -24  .25  .26 
Q(12)  625.1a  541.4a  1004.6a  617.Sa  585.0a 
WHITE(l)  21.8a  7.2a  80.8=  1.5  6.4b 
Note:  The  dependent  variable  is  the  spread  between  yields  on  low  and  high 
grade  commercial  paper  (DRISK).  FFRMSE  and  TBRMSE  are  root  mean  squared 
errors  of  changes  in  daily  federal  funds  and  3-month  Treasury  bill  rates, 
respectively;  NYSESD  is monthly  standard  deviation  of  daily  value-weighted 
returns  on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  index;  LTRDISC  and  IPDISC  are  long-term 
bond  rate  and  industrial  production  discord  measures,  respectively,  from  the 
Blue  Chip  survey. 
T-statistics  are  in parentheses.  R2  is the  adjusted  coefficient  of 
determination,  DW  is  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic,  Q(12)  is the  Ljung-Box 
Q-statistic  estimated  with  12 autocorrelations,  and  WHITE(k)  is  a chi-squared 
statistic  with  k degrees  of  freedom  used  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  a 
homoskedastic  errors  process. 
Significance  at  1%  and  5% levels  given  by  a and  b respectively. TABLE  2 
Paper-bill  Spread  Equations: 







(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
74:2-91:6  74:2-91:6  74:2-91:6  76:9-91:6  77:10-91:6 
-.002  -.012  -.007  -.015 
(0.11)  (0.80)  (0.38) 
-.olgb 
(2.11)  (1.56) 
.270b  .29eb  .397b  .268  .334 
(2.17)  (2.34)  (2.48)  (2.9$  (3.01)a 
-1.007  -.351  -.741  .097  -.142 
(1.20)  (0.53)  (0.99)  (0.24)  (0.32) 
1.393b  1.376  1.470  1.535 
(2.24)  (3.03)a 
1.43623 
(2.40)  (5.14)a  (5.00)a 
352 
(3:70)a 
. . .  . . .  . . .  . . . 
TBRMSE  .  .  .  .390  . . .  . . .  . . . 
(2.9$ 
NYSESD  . . .  . . .  .176  . . .  . . . 
(3.19)a 
LTBDISC  . . .  . . .  . . .  .311  . . . 
(3.51)a 
IPDISC  ......  ......  .181 
(2.76)a 
P  .86  .82  .83  .61  .64 
-2 
R  .78  .77  .77  .72  .68 
DW  2.01  2.04  2.01  1.86  1.88 
Q(12)  16.77  23.02b  20.80  17.39  13.44 
WHITE(15)  54.31a  65.37a  60.83a  40.9ga  32.29* 
CHOW(6)  19.86a  14.0eb  16.0eb  16.65d  17.50d 
Note:  TREND  is  a time  trend;  DRISK  is the  adjusted  spread  between  yields  on 
medium-  and  high-grade  paper;  NBR  is the  log  of  non-borrowed  reserves;  INV  is 
the  log  of  real  manufacturing  and  trade  inventories;  FFRMSE  and  TBRMSE  are 
root  mean  squared  errors  of  changes  in daily  federal  funds  and  3-month 
Treasury  bill  rates,  respectively;  NYSESD  is monthly  standard  deviation  of 
daily  value-weighted  returns  on the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  index;  LTRDISC  and 
IPDISC  are  long-term  bond  rate  and  industrial  production  discord  measures, 
respectively,  from  the  Blue  Chip  survey. 
When  diagnostic  statistics  suggest  that  serial  correlation  and/or 
heteroskedasticity  are  present,  then  t-statistics  are  constructed  from  White's 
(1980)  and  Hansen's  (1982)  heteroskedasticity-  and  autoregressive-consistent 
standard  errors,  with  4 lags  of  the  residuals2and  a dampening  factor  of  ?.C. 
(See RATS  manual  Version  4.0  for  details).  R  is  the  adjusted  coefficient  of 
determination,  DW  is  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic,  Q(12)  is  the  Ljung-Box 
Q-statistic  estimated  with  12 autocorrelations,  WHITE(k)  is  a chi-squared 
statistic  with  k degrees  of  freedom  used  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  a 
homoskedastic  errors  process,  CHOW(k)  is  a chi-squared  statistic  with  k 
degrees  of  freedom  used  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  of no  structural  change  in 
model  between  the  pre-1983  and  post-1983  (inclusive  of  1983)  periods,  p is the 
autocorrelation  coefficient. 
Significance  at  1% and  5% levels  given  by  a and  z respectively. TABLE  3 
Paper-bill  Spread  Equations: 
Monetary  Policy  Measured  by  Nonborrowed  Reserves 
and  the  Level  of Market  Interest  Rates 
Samole 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




























. . . 
. . . 
.85  .81  .81  .59  .62 
.80  .79  .80  .77  .74 
2.06  2.06  2.04  1.92  1.94 
17.95  24.94b  23.83'  16.84  14.28 
84.0gd  98.64a  97.62a  76.60a  70.15a 
21.40a  30.15a  16.7533  34.71d  24.2ga 








1.013b  .926 





.525  .549 
(3.27)a  (3.71)a 
.  .  .  . . . 
.329 
(2.68)a 
. . . 
. . .  .157 
(2.77)a 
. . .  . . . 











. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
.126 
(1.18) 











. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
.144 
(2.51)3 
Note:  TB6  is  the  6-month  Treasury  bill  rate.  See  the  notes  to  Table  2  for  a 
description  of  the  other  variables. 
When  diagnostic  statistics  suggest  that  serial  correlation  and/or 
heteroskedasticity  are  present,  then  t-statistics  are  constructed  from  White's 
(1980)  and  Hansen's  (1982)  heteroskedasticity-  and  autoregressive-consistent 
standard  errors,  with  4 lags  of  the  residuals-and  a dampening  factor  of  1.0. 
(See RATS  manual  Version  4.0  for  details).  R-/is  the  adjusted  coefficient  of 
determination,  DW  is the  Durbin-Watson  statistic,  Q(l2)  is  the  Ljung-Box 
Q-statistic  estimated  with  12  autocorrelations,  WHITE(k)  is  a chi-squared 
statistic  with  k degrees  of  freedom  used  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  a 
homoskedastic  errors  process,  CHOW(k)  is  a chi-squared  statistic  with  k 
degrees  of  freedom  used  to test  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  structural  change  in 
model  between  the  pre-1983  and  post-1983  (inclusive  of  1983)  periods,  p is the 
autocorrelation  coefficient. 
Significance  at  1% and  5% levels  given  by  a and  3 respectively. TABLE  4 
Paper-bill  Spread  Equations: 
Monetary  Policy  Measured  by  the  Federal  Funds  Rate 
Sample 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






-.015  -.015 
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.92  .89  .87 
.83  .79  .77 
2.21  2.23  2.21 
33.64a  16.54  13.97 
36.87a  14.06  30.38 
24.66a  22.72a  9.93 
. . . 
.156 
(2.85)' 
Note:  ff  is  the  federal  funds  interest  rate.  See  the  notes  to  Table  2 for  a 
description  of the  other  variables. 
When  diagnostic  statistics  suggest  that  serial  correlation  and/or 
heteroskedasticity  are  present,  then  t-statistics  are  constructed  from  White's 
(1980)  and  Hansen's  (1982)  heteroskedasticity-  and  autoregressive-consistent 
standard  errors,  with  4 lags  of  the  residualg2and  a dampening  factor  of  1.0. 
(See RATS  manual  Version  4.0  for  details).  R  is  the  adjusted  coefficient  of 
determination,  DW  is  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic,  Q(12)  is the  Ljung-Box 
Q-statistic  estimated  with  12 autocorrelations,  WHITE(k)  is a chi-squared 
statistic  with  k degrees  of  freedom  used  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  a 
homoskedastic  errors  process,  CHOW(k)  is a chi-squared  statistic  with  k 
degrees  of  freedom  used  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  structural  change  in 
model  between  the  pre-1983  and  post-1983  (inclusive  of  1983)  periods,  p  is the 
autocorrelation  coefficient. 
Significance  at  1% and  5% levels  given  by  a  and  r.  respectively. End  Notes 
‘See  Stock  and  Watson  (1989),  Bernanke  (199(l),  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1992), 
Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1992,  1993).  Bernanke  (1990)  and  Kuttner  (1992)  show 
that  the  predictive  power  of  the  spread  has  declined  in  recent  years. 
2 Kashyap,  Stein  and  Wilcox  (1993)  also  point  to  the  development  of  the  paper 
market  as  a  potential  source  for  the  spread’s  diminished  predictive  power. 
They  speculate  that  the  link  between  monetary  policy  and  the  paper-bill  spread 
will  deteriorate  because  “as  the  commercial  paper  market  deepens,  the  price 
pressure  generated  by  Fed  tightening  should  decline”  (p.  X0). 
3  Between  1969  and  1988  there  were  only  two  major  defaults  on  commercial  paper: 
The  Penn  Central  default  in  1970  and  the  Manville  Corporation  default  in  1982. 
4Commercial  paper  is  generally  issued  in  minimum  amounts  of  $25,000  while 
Treasury  bills  can  be  purchased  in  $10,000  allotments.  Also,  banks  and  other 
investors  can  use  bills  to  post  margin  requirements,  collateralize  overnight 
repurchase  agreements,  and  satisfy  bank  capital  requirements.  Commercial 
paper  cannot  be  used  for  these  purposes. 
‘See  Bernanke  (1990),  Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1993),  and  Kashyap  et  al.  (1993). 
6 See  Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1993)  for  a  discussion  of  this  point 
7 See  Kuttner  (1992)  for  a  discussion  of  this  point. 
8  Also,  rapid  growth  of  money  market  mutual  funds  has  made  divisibility  less  of 
an  issue  for  investors. 
9 It  is  also  possible  that  exogenous  changes  in  uncertainty  lead  to  both  a  rise 
in  the  paper-bill  spread  and  a  decline  in  aggregate  economic  activity.  This 
view  is  consistent  with  recent  theoretical  and  empirical  work  which  suggests 
that  uncertainty  plays  an  important  causal  role  in  tht:  business  cycle.  See 
Pindyck  (1991)  and  Ferderer  (1993). 10  Amihud  and  Mendelson  (1986)  provide  a  good  discussion  of  the  link  between 
bid-ask  spreads,  transactions  costs  and  liquidity. 
“See  Cook  (1986,  pp.  84-85). 
12See  Stigum  (1990)  p.  1051. 
13  This  last  condition  must  hold  if  investors  only  hold  bills  and  paper. 
14  See  Hahn  (1993,  p.  54)  for  a  discussion  of  the  rating  system. 
15  Kaufman  (1986)  discusses  the  widespread  downgrading  of  U.S.  firms  during  the 
1980s  in  response  to  the  dramatic  deterioration  of  firms  balance  sheets. 
16 Balke  and  Emery  (1994)  discuss  problems  associated  with  using  the  federal 
funds  rate  as  an  indicator  of  monetary  policy  in  the  post-1982  period.  They 
conclude  that  “vector  autoregression  evidence  on  the  federal  funds  rate  as  an 
indicator  of  monetary  policy  weakens  when  the  period  since  1982  is  examined.” 
17  We  also  examined  the  explanatory  power  of  real  (deflated  by  CPI)  nonborrowed 
reserves,  nonborrowed  reserves  unadjusted  for  extended  credit,  and  reserve 
growth.  In  all  cases,  the  results  were  essentially  the  same. 
18  In  his  analysis  of  equity  market  risk  premia,  Merton  focuses  on 
contemporaneous  stock  return  volatility.  By  comparison,  French  cr  ul.  (1987) 
decompose  volatility  into  expected  (e.~ wrte)  and  unexpected  volatility.  Given 
the  difficulty  of  estimating  expected  volatility,  we  restrict  our  analysis  to 
contemporaneous  volatility. 19  One  advantage  to  using  the  Blue  Chip  survey  for  this  purpose  is  that  members 
of  the  Blue  Chip  group  (economists  working  in  nonfinancial  corporations, 
financial  institutions,  and  professional  forecasting  firms)  have  strong 
financial  incentives  to  exploit  available  information  when  making  forecasts 
because  their  forecasts  are  used  either  for  internal  planning  purposes  or  are 
sold  to  organizations  that  use  them  for  this  purpose.  Moreover,  forecasts 
made  by  members  of  the  Blue  Chip  group  are  available  to  the  public  so  that 
historical  success  of  individual  forecasters  can  be  gauged.  A  second 
advantage  of  using  the  Blue  Chip  forecasts  is  that  they  allow  us  to  construct 
discord  measures  with  monthly  frequencies.  The  group  had  thirty  members  in 
August  1976  when  the  survey  began  and  fifty  in  June  1991,  the  last  month  of 
the  sample. 
20 The  Blue  Chip  group  predicts  the  average  interest  rate  over  the  current  year 
in  the  months  January  through  June  and  the  average  of  this  rate  over  the 
following  year  in  months  July  through  December.  Similarly,  industrial 
production  growth  is  forecasted  over  the  current  year  in  January  through  June 
and  over  the  following  year  in  July  through  December. 
21See  Roley  and  Troll  (1983). 
22See  Rowe  (1986,  p.  114) 
23 One  possible  object  to  this  conclusion  is  that  the  diagnostic  statistics  in 
Table  1  suggest  that  there  is  considerable  autocorrelation  in  the  residuals 
and  that  this  autocorrelation  invalidates  statistical  inferences  based  on  OLS. 
However,  the  residuals  reflect  variations  in  default  risk  which  should  exhibit 
considerable  persistence  since  default  risk  is  correlated  with  movements  in 
economic  activity  which  are  highly  persistent.  Standard  procedures  to  correct 
for  autocorrelated  disturbances  cannot  be  justified  if  the  autocorrelation 
arises  from  this  source. 24 Also,  by  including  the  interest  rate  level  in  the  regressions  we  are  able  to 
check  whether  the  interest  rate  volatility  series  are  significant  determinants 
of  the  spread  only  because  they  proxy  for  the  level  of  market  rates. 
25 The  ideal  way  to  measure  the  relative  liquidity  of  the  commercial  paper  and 
Treasury  bill  markets  is  to  compare  the  bid-ask  spreads  prevailing  in  each. 
Unfortunately,  data  on  commercial  paper  bid-ask  spreads  is  not  publicly 
available.  Nevertheless,  Stoll  (1985)  has  shown  empirically  that  bid-ask 
spreads  for  different 
26Profits  are  before 
interest  payments. 
37 
assets  are  negatively  correlated  with  trading  volume. 
tax  profits  plus  capital  consumption  allowances,  plus  net 
L’In  fact,  the  coefficients  on  nonborrowed  reserves  became  more  significantly 
negative  when  the  dummy  and  interaction  terms  were  included  in  the  models  to 
obtain  the  Chow  statistics. 
28 Interestingly,  the  timing  of  the  uncertainty  coefficient  decline  corresponds 
roughly  with  the  sharp  rise  in  the  relative  liquidity  of  paper  suggested  by 
Figure  7. 
2gThe  fact  that  the  coefficient  temporarily  falls  during  the  19X0  to  1982 
period  may  reflect  the  fact  that  there  is  a  concave  nonlinear  relationship 
between  the  paper-bill  spread  and  federal  funds  rate  volatility.  That  is,  the 
coefficient  may  have  declined  somewhat  in  this  period  due  to  the  high  levels 
of  federal  funds  rate  volatility. 30  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  distinguish  between  the  two  versions  of  the 
monetary  hypothesis  based  on  these  results.  Recall  that  the  credit  crunch 
hypothesis  predicts  that  the  relationship  should  have  disappeared  immediately 
following  the  removal  of  Regulation  Q  in  the  late  1970s.  In  contrast,  the 
imperfect  substitutes  hypothesis  suggests  that  the  deterioration  of  the 
relationship  should  be  slower,  reflecting  the  gradual  development  of  the 
secondary  market  for  paper.  Results  using  nonborrowed  reserves  to  measure  the 
stance  of  policy  favor  the  imperfect  substitutability  hypothesis,  while 
results  using  the  federal  funds  rate  support  the  credit  crunch  hypothesis. 